Introduction

The research problem
The purpose of this study is to analyse the way in which the European Court of Human Rights (herein referred to as 'the Court') has dealt with evidence obtained in violation of the rights of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (herein referred to as 'the Convention'). In particular, this study will focus on the circumstances in which the Court maintained that evidence should be excluded from the proceedings in order to secure a fair trial. This study will demonstrate that the Court has not always ordered the exclusion of all evidence obtained in violation of a Convention right. What is even more surprising, some types of evidence obtained in violation of a Convention right were not considered to affect the fairness of the proceedings. This study will present the considerations taken into account by the Court when deciding whether the fairness of the proceedings would be affected and whether there was a need for the exclusion of evidence from the trial.
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-to the exclusion of the evidence as a form of procedural reparation. This article will examine critically the rationality of the considerations taken into account by the Court, mainly with a focus on the second and third thresholds.
Delimitation and justification of this study
The Court's jurisdiction is governed by, amongst others, the principle of primarity and the principle of subsidiarity. This means that the Court and national courts share the task of dealing with human rights claims, and that this task is procedurally and substantively delimited. l The exhaustion of domestic proceedings delimits procedurally the jurisdiction of the Court, whereas the rights set forth in the Convention represent the framework that delimits it substantively. From this delimitation follows that the Court does not have jurisdiction to deal with claims against national law so long as there are no repercussions for Convention rights. It also follows that the Court is not to be considered a fourth instance tribunal. It can only deal with violations of Convention rights and cannot reassess facts or reopen the evidence stage.
The issue of evidence and its assessment seem to be a grey area with respect to which States exercise their margin of appreciation; the Court, however, retains its jurisdiction to supervise that the States' discretion is exercised in accordance with the rights of the Convention. 2 This discreThe definition of these principles is well articulated by Jonas Christoffersen. According to Christoffersen, the principle of primarity refers to the obligarions of national authorities to implement the Convention, i.e. the existence of domestic remedies to enforce the Convention rights. The principle of subsidiarity refers to the review functions the Court has over national judgments, i.e. the need to exhaust domestic remedies to trig- Gasper states that the ECtHR exercises exceptional jurisdiction on issues of evidence in cases when it impacts fair trial rights. In particular, this happens when the right to oppose the use of tainted evidence is at stake, when evidence obtained in violation of a Convention right impacts the conviction of the accused, or when the quality of the evidence goes against the right against self-incrimination.
